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Michelle Arnopol Cecil'
INTRODUCTION
007 and 2oo8 saw an unprecedented rise in the number of home mortgage
2 foreclosures across the country,2 and this trend is likely to continue for
some time.3 These numerous foreclosures, brought on largely by the failure
of the sub-prime mortgage market, have had a crippling effect on the
United States economy.4 One significant outcome of this economic disaster
is its crushing impact on the country's bankruptcy system. In fact, experts
predict that the housing crisis will force consumers to file for bankruptcy
protection in greater numbers than ever before.5 Some commentators have
even suggested that recent changes in bankruptcy law may have played a
role in precipitating the mortgage loan crisis.
6
In 2005, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act.7 The act was designed to reduce abuse of the
bankruptcy process by forcing more debtors to pay their debts rather
than having them discharged in bankruptcy.8 Yet despite this sweeping
I Curator's Distinguished Teaching Professor and William H. Pittman Professor of Law,
University of Missouri School of Law. B.A., J.D., University of Illinois. Thanks go to Clay
Cundiff, Jeffrey Erickson, Brandon Hill, and Josephine Pottebaum for their invaluable re-
search assistance and to Cheryl Poelling for her indispensable administrative assistance.
2 Stephanie Armour, 2oo8 Foreclosure Filings Set Record, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2oo9, at IB;
Richard Simon, Senators to Try to Drive Bill Down Different Street, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at
AL.
3 See Editorial, Foreclosures and the Election, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, at WK I1.
4 David Leonhardt, Can't Grasp Credit Crisis? Join the Club, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, zoo8, at
Ai; Jonathan Peterson, FDIC Chairwoman Is Right on the Money, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at
C2.
5 See, e.g., Susan Herendeen, Increase in Bankruptcies is Predicted: Court Official Says Slump
in Housing May FuelRise, MODESTO BEE, Jan. 5, 2007, at AI; Julie Vorman, Growing Bankruptcy
Filings A Grim Omen, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2oo8, at C6.
6 See Gail Appleson, New Rules Slowed Filings, For a While, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Apr.
6, 2oo8, at CI; Is the BAPCPA Increasing Foreclosure Gloom?, 50 No. 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP)
4 (Aug. 5, 2oo8); Dan Margolies, U.S. Mortgage Meltdown Linked to 2oo5 Bankruptcy Law, KAN.
CITY STAR, Jan. 12, 2oo9, at AI.
7 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA'),
Pub. L. No. 1o9-8, 19 Stat. 23 (2005).
8 WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN & LAWRENCE R. AHERN III, 2005 BANKRUPTCY REFORM
LEGISLATION WITH ANALYSIS 2D, § 8:1 (Thomson/West 2006). See also Press Release, White
House Press Office, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection
Act (Apr. 20, 2oo5), available at 2005 WLNR 6178099 ("In recent years, too many people
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bankruptcy reform legislation, more debtors are filing bankruptcy each
year.9 In April, 2008, for example, consumer bankruptcy filings had
increased by more than forty-seven percent over the same time in 2007. I0
Similarly, 2007 saw a thirty-eight percent increase in consumer bankruptcy
filings over 2oo6," while business bankruptcies increased forty-four
percent during the same period. 2 It is no surprise, then, that bankruptcy
courts face an ever increasing caseload burden, which results in decreased
efficiency and skyrocketing administrative costs. 3 With such a burden
facing the country's bankruptcy courts, it is imperative that Congress step
in to resolve many of the complex issues of statutory interpretation in the
Bankruptcy Code' 4 with which the courts are grappling.
One issue of major significance is how debtors' attorneys are compensated
in bankruptcy. Over the past several years, the Supreme Court has twice
had occasion to visit the issue of attorneys' fees in bankruptcy. In Travelers
Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., '5 the Supreme
Court overruled the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fobian v. Western Farm
Credit Bank (In re Fobian),I6 in which the Ninth Circuit had held that
unsecured creditors could not collect post-petition attorneys' fees incurred
in litigating issues of federal bankruptcy law, even though they could
collect fees for litigating issues of state statutory law or contract law.I7 The
Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code provided no statutory basis
for such a distinction and struck down the long-standing Fobian rule.' 8
have abused the bankruptcy laws. They've walked away from debts even when they had the
ability to repay them ... Under the new law, Americans who have the ability to pay will be
required to pay back at least a portion of their debts.").
9 Appleson, supra note 6.
io Consumer Bankruptcies Up 47.7% From April 200 7, KAN. CiTY STAR, May 3, 2008, at C5.
i i Bankruptcy Filings Rise38% in U.S. in 2007, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at C2.
12 Business Filings Up 44% in 2007, 49 No. 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 1, 4-5 (Apr. 29,
2oo8).
13 See, e.g., Matt Evans, Bankruptcy Reform May Hinder Court, Pro Bono Work, Bus. J. OF
THE GREATER TRIAD AREA, July 29, 2005, http://www.bizjournals.com/triad/stories/2005/o8/ol/
story5.html ("[N]o additional funds have been allocated to the courts to help absorb the
increased demands."). In addition to skyrocketing court costs, BAPCPA has been predicted
to nearly double the fees that attorneys charge to file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of a
debtor. See Lorene Yue, Bankruptcy Reform Toughens Consumers' Exit From Debt, Cui. TRm.,
Mar. 27, 2005, at Bus. 5.
14 Unless otherwise stated, references in this Article to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the
"Code" are to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified as amended at i i U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (West 2004 & Supp. zoo8)).
15 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007).
16 Fobian v. W. Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 E2d 1149 (9th Cir. i991), cert. de-
nied, 505 U.S. 1220 (1992).
17 Fobian, 951 F.zd at 1153.
18 Travelers, 549 U.S. at 453-54. The Supreme Court refused, however, to address wheth-
er other principles of bankruptcy law disallowed unsecured creditors' post-petition attorneys'
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In its second case addressing the treatment of attorneys' fees in
bankruptcy, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Lamie v.
United States Trustee,'9 in which it resolved a conflict among the circuits on
the proper priority to be granted to debtors' attorneys' fees in bankruptcy.2"
In reaching its decision, the Court was forced to grapple with whether a
1994 congressional amendment to section 330 of the Code was intentional,
or instead was merely a scrivener's error.2' The amendment eliminated
priority treatment for debtors' attorneys' fees in Chapter 7 and i i bankruptcy
proceedings, but not in Chapter 12 or 13 proceedings. 2 2 The Supreme
Court held that the attorneys' fees were not entitled to administrative
priority treatment under the Bankruptcy Code.23 The Lamie decision has
had a significant impact on how debtors' attorneys are compensated in
bankruptcy.
Much has been written about the post-petition attorneys' fees issue
that the Court addressed in Travelers,'4 yet there is a void in the academic
literature regarding the priority granted attorneys' fees in the aftermath
of Lamie.25 This Article seeks to fill that void. Part I details the statutory
provisions governing the administrative priority, with special emphasis
on the amendments made to section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code
in 1994. Part II then addresses the conflicting case law on the priority
issue, examining the three court of appeals cases that held that the 1994
amendments to the Code were the result of a scrivener's error, and the
three court of appeals cases that enforced the statutory changes as drafted.
fees to be added to the creditors' unsecured claims against the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 454-
55. See also Mark S. Scarberry, Interpreting Bankruptcy Code Sections 502 and 506: Post-Petition
Attorneys' Fees in a Post-Travelers World, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 611,612 (2007).
19 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
20 Id. at 53 1; see infra notes 125-i45 and accompanying text.
21 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 530-39; see also infra notes 128-145 and accompanying text.
22 See i i U.S.C. §§ 33o(a), 33o(a)(4)(B) (2oo6); see also infra notes 137-i38 and accompa-
nying text.
23 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538-39; see also infra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., Richard J. Corbi, Update: Postpetition Attorney's Fees Following the Supreme Court
Decision of Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 17
NORTON J. or BANKR. L. & PRAc. 2 Art. 6 (zoo8); Kelly E. McDonald, Unsecured Claims for
Contract-Based Attorney s Fees: Fobian Is Dead, But Does Justice Holmes' Decision In Randolph
& Randolph v. Scruggs Have Continuing Vitality?, 5 NORTON BAKR. L. ADVISER, May, 2007,
at i; Scarberry, supra note I8; Jennifer M. Taylor & Christopher J. Mertens, Travelers and
the Implications on the Allowability of Unsecured Creditors' Claims for Post-Petition Attorneys' Fees
Against the Bankruptcy Estate, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 123 (2007).
25 Two short articles discussing Lamie appeared in the American Bankruptcy Institute
Journal shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Lamie, but there is a
dearth of academic literature about the far-reaching implications of the case since that time.
See C.R. "Chip" Bowlcs, Jr., Watching Sausage Being Made-The Supreme Court, Not the FDA, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, at 30-31; Dillon E. Jackson, Lamenting Lamie andthe Appointment of
the Chapter ii Trustee, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2004, at 28.
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Part III of the Article examines the Supreme Court's decision in Lamie
from a statutory interpretation standpoint. Part IV traces the history of the
administrative priority, as well as the policy justifications for the Bankruptcy
Code's priority rules. Arguing that debtors' attorneys' fees fall outside the
policy underpinnings of the administrative priority, the Article proposes
a statutory amendment to the Bankruptcy Code to clarify the treatment
of attorneys' fees in bankruptcy and resolve this thorny issue of statutory
interpretation. The Article concludes that congressional adoption of this
amendment will be a small step toward easing the burden on the country's
bankruptcy courts so that they can operate more efficiently during these
difficult economic times.
I. A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE PRIORITY AFFORDED
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN BANKRUPTCY
When a debtor files for bankruptcy protection under any chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code, an estate is created by operation of law.26 The estate
includes all of the debtor's pre-petition property, with certain very limited
exceptions.2 7 The bankruptcy trustee sells this property, which is referred
to as "property of the estate," in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, and
distributes the proceeds to creditors in a specified order.,8 In Chapter I I
and 13 bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor generally retains property of
the estate and uses post-petition assets to pay its creditors in accordance
with the debtor's plan of reorganization.9 In Chapter 7 proceedings,
the debts of unsecured creditors are paid pro rata, unless those creditors
hold claims entitled to priority under section 507 of the Bankruptcy
Code.3o The trustee pays creditors holding priority claims before general
unsecured creditors, in accordance with their specified order of priority.3'
Thus, unsecured creditors holding first priority claims are entitled to full
payment of their claims before unsecured creditors holding lower priority
claims receive any payment. If there are insufficient assets to pay a class of
priority claimants in full, they are entitled to payment pro rata based on the
amount of their claims.32 Because debtors rarely have enough assets to pay
all of their creditors in full, it is very important that a creditor establish that
it holds a claim entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Code.
26 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2ooo).
27 Id. § 541(b), (c)(2).
28 Id. §§ 541, 726.
29 See Id. §§ 1115, 1129, 13o6, 1325.
30 Id. § 726.
31 For a complete list of priority claims, see § 507. See also infra notes 198-216 and ac-
companying text.
32 I1 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2oo6); see also Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53,58 (199o).
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The Code establishes ten classes of priority claims. 33 This Article
will focus on the second category of priority claims, which includes
"administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this title." 34
The policy justification for allowing administrative expenses high priority
is because the bankruptcy estate must pull its own weight, and granting
administrative expenses second priority will ensure that the trustee is able
to expend sums to administer the estate in a manner that maximizes value
for the benefit of all creditors. 35 Thus, administrative expenses enumerated
in section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code include wages to employees for
services that they render to the debtor after the bankruptcy proceeding
is filed; taxes incurred by the estate, including penalties on such taxes;
expenses incurred by creditors in recovering assets hidden by the debtor;
and "compensation and reimbursement awarded under section 33o(a)."3
6
Section 33o(a) is the subject of this Article. As originally enacted in
1978, section 33o(a)(I) provided that "the court may award to a trustee,
to an examiner, or to a professional person employed under section 327 or
1103 of this title, or to the debtor's attorney: (i) reasonable compensation for
actual, necessary services rendered by such trustee, examiner, professional
person, or attorney . . . and (2) reimbursement for actual, necessary
33 I1 U.S.C. § 507(a)(i)-(Io) (West 2004 & Supp. zoo8). The first category of priority
claims includes domestic support obligations. Second priority is granted to administrative
expenses of the bankruptcy estate. Creditors holding claims for debts arising after a debtor is
forced into an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding but before the case is determined to have
been properly filed are entitled to third priority. Fourth priority is granted to certain employee
wages earned within i8o days before an employer's bankruptcy filing, within certain monetary
limits. Certain contributions to employee benefit plans are accorded fifth priority, and claims
of farmers and fishermen, up to a specified statutory maximum, are granted sixth priority.
Individuals holding unsecured claims of up to $2425 (indexed for inflation) on certain types of
security deposits are entitled to seventh priority. Eighth priority claims include a wide variety
of tax claims, including income taxes, property taxes, excise taxes, and trust fund taxes. Ninth
priority is granted to certain claims of federal depository institutions, and personal injury and
wrongful death claims arising out of a debtor's use of a motor vehicle or boat while the debtor
was intoxicated from alcohol or drugs are entitled to tenth priority. Id.
34 Id. § 5o7(a)(2) (West Supp. zoo8). Second priority administrative expenses also in-
clude "charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of title 28." Id. Expenses falling
within this category are not the subject of this Article.
35 See, e.g., 6 JAMES M. HENDERSON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 2633 (5th ed. 1952); Hall v. Perry (In fr Cochise Coll. Park, Inc.), 703 F2d 1339, 1355
(9th Cir. 1983); In reTebo, IO E 419,420 (D. W. Va. 19oo).
36 1i U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)-(8) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). Section 503(b)(4) provides for
administrative priority treatment for compensation of attorneys, but only those who render
services to creditors or those who act in a manner that benefits the bankruptcy estate, such as
prosecuting a criminal offense with respect to the debtor's business or property, because such
actions benefit all creditors and not merely the creditor incurring the costs of prosecution. Id.
at § 503(b)(4). Accordingly, attorneys' fees awarded under section 503(b)(4) do not encompass
the attorneys' fees for the debtor.
2009-20][0]
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expenses."37 Case law under section 33o(a) was nearly uniform in holding
that a debtor's attorneys' fees were entitled to administrative priority under
the Bankruptcy Code, so long as the fees either benefited the bankruptcy
estate or were necessary for the proper administration of the bankruptcy
case.3
s
Congress amended section 33o(a) dramatically in 1994, deleting the
debtor's attorney from the list of professionals entitled to administrative
priority treatment under the Code.39 As amended in 1994, section 33o(a)
stated that "the court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional
person employed under section 327 or 1103: (A) reasonable compensation
for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee, examiner, professional
person, orattorney and by any paraprofessional person employed by any such
person; and (B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. ' '4° Although
any reference to the debtor's attorney was removed from the general
language of section 33o(a)(i), Congress retained a reference to an attorney
in section 33o(a)(I)(A). There is a missing disjunction between "examiner"
and "professional person" in section 33o(a)(i). These disparities have
provided debtors' attorneys with ammunition for arguing that Congress's
elimination of debtors' attorneys from the list of professionals entitled to
administrative priority was inadvertent, as discussed in greater detail in the
37 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 330, 92 Stat. 2549 (repealed
2oo5) (emphasis added). Section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code now provides that "the trustee,
with the court's approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auc-
tioneers, or other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the
estate ... in carrying out a trustee's duties under this title." II U.S.C. § 327(a) (2oo6).
38 See, e.g., In reTS Indus., Inc., 125 B.R. 638 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991); In re Holden, lO
B.R. 573 (Bankr, N.D. Iowa 1989); In re Brady, zo B.R. 936 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
39 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 224, io8 Stat. 41o6, 4130
(1994).
4o Id. (emphasis added). These provisions were amended again in 2005, as part of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, to add certain om-
budsmen to the list of professionals entitled to administrative priority treatment under the
Bankruptcy Code. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. lO9-8, §§ 232, 1104, 1 19 Stat. 23, 73-74, 191-192 (2005). Section 330(a)(i) now
states:
(a)(1) [T]he court may award to a trustee, a consumer privacy ombudsman
appointed under section 332, an examiner, an ombudsman appointed
under section 333, or a professional person employed under section 327
or 1103 -
(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by
the trustee, examiner, ombudsman, professional person, or attorney and
by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.
I I U.S.C. § 33o(a)(I )(A)-(B) (2oo6). This amendment, however, does not affect the attorneys'
fees issue discussed in this Article.
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following section.
Another provision added by the 1994 amendments works against
attorneys' arguments that the elimination of the phrase "or the debtor's
attorney" was inadvertent. As part of the 1994 changes, Congress
significantly expanded section 330, providing that a bankruptcy court
cannot allow compensation for services not "(I) reasonably likely to benefit
the debtor's estate; or (II) necessary to the administration of the case."'4 It
carved out an exception to this rule, however, for reasonable compensation of
an individual debtor's attorney in Chapter 12 and 13 cases.42 This provision
suggests that Congress intended that only Chapter 12 and 13 attorneys be
entitled to administrative priority for their fees in representing a debtor in
bankruptcy, and then only if the debtor is an individual. 43
Following the bankruptcy amendments of 1994, there have been two
attempts to amend section 330 to include the debtor's attorney in the list
of administrative priority claimants. In 1996 Senate Bill 1559, entitled
the Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 1996, 44 passed the Senate on
August 2, 1996, by unanimous vote.45 It was then received into the House
of Representatives, but no action was taken on the bill in the House.
The following year, two bills were introduced in the House: House
Resolution 12046 and House Resolution 764.47 Both proposed that the
41 11 U.S.C. § 33o(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I)-(II) (2006).
42 Id. § 33o(a)(4)(B). The provision states:
In a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual,
the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor's attorney
representing the interests of the debtor in connection with the bank-
ruptcy case based on a consideration of the benefit and necessity of such
services to the debtor and the other factors set forth in this section.
Id.
43 Cases decided since the 1994 amendments have found that Congress expressly in-
tended this result. See, e.g., In re Gutierrez, 309 B.R. 488,5oi (Bankr. WD. Tex. 2004) (Section
33o(a)(4)(B) "creates an independent standard for paying debtor's counsel in chapter 13 cases,
quite different from the newly revised standards for professionals employed under section
327 found in section 33o(a)(3) and (4)(A)"); see also In re Busetta-Silvia, 314 B.R. 218, 224
(B.A.P. ioth Cir. 2004) ("We find § 33o(a)(4)(B) to be unambiguous and hold that it provides
the requisite basis to allow prepetition fees as an administrative claim.").
44 S. 1559, 104th Cong. § 4 (1996). Section 4 of the Act proposed that section 330 of the
Bankruptcy Code be amended to insert the phrase "or the debtor's attorney" after " 1103."
45 143 CONG. REC. D1272-0, D1274 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).
46 H.R. 120, Io5th Cong. § 7 (1997). House Bill 120 was drafted by the minority party
and was introduced and sponsored by Representative John Conyers. H.R. REP. No. 105-845,
at 116 (I999).
47 H.R. 764, 1o5th Cong. § 4 (1997). House Bill 764 was drafted by the House's majority
party and was sponsored by Representatives Henry Hyde, George Gekas, and Bill McCollum.
H.R. REP. No. 105-845, at 116 (1999). The purpose of H.R. 764 was primarily to make "tech-
nical corrections which are intended to clarify original intent, correct drafting defects, and
improve grammar and cross-references in the Bankruptcy Code." 143 CONG. REC. HIo66o--o2
2009- 2010 ]
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language "or the debtor's attorney" be added back into section 33o(a)(i)
of the Bankruptcy Code. In June of 1997, the House Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law amended House Resolution 764 to
reconcile the differences between it and its sister bill, House Resolution
120.48 House Resolution 764 passed the House by voice vote,49 but died
when it reached the Senate.
It is interesting to note that later in 1997 Senator Grassley introduced
Senate Resolution 1301, which incorporated much of House Resolution
764, but did not include the amendment to add debtors' attorneys' fees back
into section 330. It appears from Senator Grassley's remarks in introducing
the bill that this omission was intentional:
I believe that Congress needs to look long and hard at the way attorneys are
compensated in bankruptcy. It seems to me, from the reports I receive from
around the country, that attorneys are using up the assets of the bankruptcy
estate without really contributing very much. And attorney's fees are paid
ahead of and at the expense of schools, workers, and children entitled to
support. I think that's something we need to change.50
Thus, not only did the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code raise
significant issues of statutory interpretation, but subsequent Congressional
action (or inaction in this case) served to exacerbate the problems caused
by these amendments. It is not surprising, then, that courts attempting to
interpret section 330 after 1994 have reached conflicting conclusions, as
discussed below.
II. CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON THE ATTORNEYS' FEES ISSUE
The issue of the priority of a debtor's attorneys' fees in bankruptcy has
resulted in a classic split among the circuit courts of appeals. The Fourth,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the 1994 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code preclude first priority treatment to a debtor's attorney
in both Chapter 7 and I I proceedings.5 1 Conversely, the Second, Third,
and Ninth Circuits have treated debtor's attorneys' fees in Chapter 7 and
(daily ed. Nov. 12, 1997) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
48 H.R. REP. No. io5-845, at 117 (1999).
49 Id. at i8.
50 143 CONG. REC. $94o6-oi (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1997) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (em-
phasis added).
51 See U.S. Tr. v. Equip. Sers., Inc. (In re Equip. Servs., Inc.), 29o E3d 739, 745 (4th
Cir. 2002), cert. granted, Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 538 U.S. 905 (2003); Inglesby, Falligant, Home,
Courington & Nash, P.C. v. Moore (In reAm. Steel Prod., Inc.), 197 E3d 1354, 1356 (1 ith Cir.
1999); Andrews & Kurth L.L.P. v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In rePro-Snax Distribs., Inc.), 157 F3d
414,423,425 (5th Cir. 1998).
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i i proceedings as first priority administrative expenses on the grounds
that the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, which excluded such
attorneys' fees from priority treatment, were the result of a scrivener's
error.52 Each of these positions will be examined in further detail below.
A. Cases Allowing Priority Treatment to Attorneys' Fees
The first court of appeals to reach the issue of whether attorneys' fees
are entitled to administrative priority treatment in bankruptcy was the
Second Circuit in In re Ames Department Stores, Inc.53 The facts of Ames are
somewhat complicated. In the course of representing Ames Department
Stores in a Chapter i i reorganization, the highly regarded firm of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom sought to terminate the company's group
life insurance plan.54 Although Ames possessed the contractual right to
terminate the plan, section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code made it difficult to
terminate such plans, establishing specific procedures for the modification of
employee benefits in bankruptcy.55 Skadden filed the motion to terminate
the plan without regard to section I 114, and the bankruptcy court denied
its motion, stating that there was no doubt that section 1I14 applied to the
plan's termination56 Skadden appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to
the district court, which not only affirmed the ruling, but also stated that
Skadden should not receive any fees for its work on the appeal because
it was frivolous and was designed merely to raise Skadden's fees in the
bankruptcy proceeding artificially57
After the reorganization plan for Ames was approved by the bankruptcy
court, Skadden filed a fee application for its services rendered during
the reorganization. Following the instructions of the district court, the
bankruptcy court disallowed $35,000 in fees associated with the earlier
appeal. Skadden appealed the bankruptcy court's order to the district
court, which, again, affirmed the order.58 Skadden then appealed the
issue to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the propriety of
the district court's refusal to grant its attorneys' fees. The Second Circuit
52 See In reTop Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F3d 123, 130 (3d Cir. 2ooo), abrogated by Lamie
v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004); U.S. Tr. v. Garvey, Schubert & Barer (In re Century Cleaning
Servs., Inc.), 195 F3d 1053, io61 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated by Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526
(2004); In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 76 E3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1996), abrogated by Lamie v.
U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
53 In fr Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 76 E3d 66 (zd Cir. 1996).
54 Id. at 68.
55 II U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
56 Ames, 76 E3d at 69. The bankruptcy court issued its ruling from the bench, and the
ruling was not published.
57 Id. The district court's ruling was also unpublished.
58 In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2192, 1995 WL 338253, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
7, 1995).
2009-20i1
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found that the district court failed to specify any authority for imposition
of sanctions on Skadden or to provide due process by way of notice and
opportunity to be heard.5 9 The Second Circuit also found that Skadden's
conduct was not sanctionable because the applicability of section 1114 of
the Bankruptcy Code to the company's group life insurance plan was "a
wide open question."'
The Second Circuit next addressed Skadden's request that its fees
be granted first priority as administrative expenses under section 330 of
the Code. The court acknowledged that "debtors' attorneys were not
specifically included in the coverage of the amended section 33o," but then
agreed with Collier on Bankruptcy that the omission was inadvertent. 6' The
Second Circuit ultimately held, however, that its decision did not turn on
whether the omission of debtors' attorneys from section 330 was inadvertent,
because if the facts of the case before it indicated that Skadden's services
benefited the bankruptcy estate, they would have been compensable as
administrative priority expenses under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code
even if the omission was not inadvertent.
62
Three years after the Second Circuit's decision in Ames, the Ninth
Circuit had occasion to revisit the issue in United States Trustee v. Garvey,
Schubert & Barer (In re Century Cleaning Services, Inc.).63 In the case, Century
Cleaning Services filed a Chapter i i bankruptcy petition and hired the
law firm of Garvey, Schubert & Barer to represent it in the proceeding.
64
Garvey petitioned the bankruptcy court to serve as counsel for Century
as debtor-in-possession, and its application was granted. 65 At the time
of the Chapter i i filing, Garvey had already been compensated fully for
its pre-petition services. The case was then converted to a Chapter 7
proceeding and the bankruptcy court appointed a trustee to administer the
debtor's bankruptcy estate, but Garvey continued to provide legal services
for its client, Century, "including filing the conversion petition, preparing
schedules, amended reports, a statement of affairs, and a Rule 2015 report,
communicating with creditors, and participating in 2004 examinations."
'
Garvey failed to apply to the court for reappointment in Century's Chapter
7 proceeding.
When Garvey filed its fee application for services performed during
59 Ames, 76 E3d at 70.
6o Id. at 7L
6I Id. at 71-72.See also3 COLLIER ON BANKRu-rcy9i 330.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev.) (2009). ; id. q 330.04.
62 Id. at 71-72 (citing In reTaxman Clothing Co., 49 E3d 310, 315 (7th Cir. 1995)).
63 U.S. Tr. v. Garvey, Schubert & Barer (In r Century Cleaning Servs., Inc.), 195 F.3d
1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
64 Id. at 1054.
65 Id.
66 Id. at IO55.
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the pendency of the Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee objected to its
application, and the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee, holding
that the plain language of the statute did not authorize payment. 7 The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, 
6
and Garvey appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.
After reviewing the 1994 amendments to section 330 of the Bankruptcy
Code, the Ninth Circuit overturned the decisions of the lower courts,
holding that Garvey was eligible for compensation as an administrative
priority under the Bankruptcy Code.69 The court determined that the
statute was ambiguous because there was an internal conflict between
section 33o(a)(i), which excluded the phrase "or to the debtor's attorney"
and section 33o(a)(i)(A), which included the debtor's attorney within the
ambit of compensable administrative priority expenses.70 This ambiguity,
according to the court, allowed it to examine the statute's legislative
history. The court concluded that the legislative history supported the
proposition that the omission of a debtor's attorney fees in section 33o(a)(I )
was a drafting error. The court noted that, before the amendment, the
sentence was not ambiguous and both portions of the provision included
reference to the debtor's attorney, as was true with the original version
of the 1994 amendments when they were first introduced in Congress.7'
After examining the history of the amendment to section 33o(a)(I), the
court noted that the section was amended by Senator Metzenbaum to
consolidate the new subsection that provided for objections by the United
States Trustee with another similar provision, and not to eliminate a debtor's
attorney from the list of compensable professionals. 72 The court observed
that the material that was moved was directly before the words "or to the
debtor's attorney" and that the deletion of that phrase when the words
preceding it were moved was most likely an "unintended slip of the pen"
and not a deliberate omission.3
The Ninth Circuit also noted that, as a policy matter, eliminating
a debtor's attorney from the list of compensable officers would make it
more difficult for Chapter 7 debtors to obtain counsel. Moreover, the court
concluded that such a significant change in the bankruptcy law would not
have occurred without a mention of the change during the enactment of
67 In re Century Cleaning Servs., Inc., 202 B.R. I49, 151 (Bankr. D. Or. 1996).
68 U.S. Tr. v. Garvey, Schubert & Barer (In re Century Cleaning Servs., Inc.), 2 15 B.R. 18,
22 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).
69 Century Cleaning Servs., 195 F3d at 1054.
70 Id. at 1057 (citing In re Miller, 211 B.R. 399,4O1-O (Bankr. D. Kan. 1997)).
71 Century CleaningServs., 195 E3d at 1058.
72 Id. at 1O59; see also 140 CONG. REC. S4741-oI(daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994); 140 CONG. REc.
S44o5-o6 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994).
73 Century Cleaning Servs., 195 E3d at lo59--6o.
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the 1994 amendments. 74 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit allowed Garvey
to receive its fees as an administrative priority under section 330 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
75
The final circuit to address the priority issue was the Third Circuit
in In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc. 76 Top Grade Sausage, Inc. and Forist
Distributors, Inc. were both New Jersey businesses owned and managed
by the Lipari family. When the family patriarch amassed considerable
debt defending himself from criminal prosecution, Top Grade and Forist
voluntarily filed separate Chapter i petitions. 77 The bankruptcy court
administered the cases together, primarily because of the commonality of
the parties involved and because the issues were substantially the same
in both cases. 7s The bankruptcy court granted the debtors' application
for retention of Hellring, Lindeman, Goldstein & Siegal as their counsel.
Because there was significant acrimony during the reorganization, Hellring
was required to address many conflicts that arose. When the reorganization
was unsuccessful, the bankruptcy court converted both cases to Chapter 7
proceedings. Hellring later filed an application for over $8o,ooo in attorneys'
fees as an administrative priority, and the bankruptcy trustee objected to
the motion.79 After a hearing, the bankruptcy court disallowed the payment
of fees or expenses by the estate to Hellring for services rendered during
the attempted reorganizations, but did allow compensation for services
rendered after the cases were converted to Chapter 7.80 The bankruptcy
court reasoned that Hellring's services in the Chapter ii proceeding
duplicated the services rendered by the bankruptcy trustee."
After the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, Hellring
appealed the decision to the Third Circuit, which examined section 330 of
the Bankruptcy Code in great detail, noting that the 1994 amendments
were remarkable for two reasons.s2 First, the debtor's attorney was removed
from the list of officers eligible to receive compensation as an administrative
priority s3 Second, the list of compensable officers was separated not by the
74 Id. at io6o.
75 Id. at IO61. Judge Thomas dissented, arguing that the statute's plain language indicat-
ed that Congress intended to eliminate debtors' attorneys from the list of compensable officers
under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at io61-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting)(citations
omitted).
76 In rTop Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F3d 123 (3d Cif. 2000).
77 Id. at 125-26.
78 Id. at iz6.
79 Id.
8o Id. The bankruptcy court issued its ruling from the bench, and the ruling was not
published.
81 See id.
8z Id. at 127. The district court's ruling was also unpublished.
83 Id.
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term "or," but merely by a comma. 4 The court stated that "[tihis omission
renders the section grammatically unsound. ' 5  The court found that the
omission of the phrase "or the debtor's attorney" from section 330 was
ambiguous and inconsistent with other provisions within the same section
of the Bankruptcy Code.' It noted that the "most striking effect caused by
the omission is on the internal consistency of § 330 itself... As § 330 now
reads .... the second half of the sentence seems to partially permit what
the first half prohibits."7
The Third Circuit also noted that section 33o(a)(4)(B) allows for
attorneys' fees for debtors in Chapter 12 and 13 proceedings if the debtor
is an individual, and it discussed whether that provision limited the
compensation of attorneys in Chapter 7 proceedings. 88 The court held that
the provision allowing attorneys' fees in Chapter 12 and 13 proceedings
merely set forth a different standard for determining whether debtors'
attorneys were entitled to reimbursement in those cases and did not
suggest that other attorneys were not entitled to reimbursement. 9 The
court ultimately concluded that debtors' attorneys were entitled to receive
their fees as a first priority administrative expense, but only if the attorneys'
services were "reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate."9° The
court concluded that Hellring's services could have been performed by the
trustee instead, and therefore were not compensable. 9'
B. Cases Disallowing Priority Treatment to Attorneys' Fees
The Fifth Circuit was the first court of appeals to hold that fees incurred
by a debtor's attorney were not entitled to administrative priority treatment
under the Bankruptcy Code after it was amended in 1994. In Andrews &
Kurth L.L.P v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In rePro-Snax Distributors, Inc.),92 creditors
of Pro-Snax Distributors forced the company into an involuntary Chapter
7 bankruptcy proceeding on August 10, 1995.93 The court appointed an
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 128.
87 Id. at 128-29.
88 Id. at 129-3o. The Third Circuit suggested that other courts have concluded, based
on section 33o(a)(4)(B), that Chapter 7 and i i attorneys are precluded from administrative
priority treatment based on the statutory construction canon, expressio unius estexclusio altenius.
Id. at 130 (citing U.S. Tr. v. Garvey, Schubert & Barer (In re Century Cleaning Servs., Inc.), 195
F3d 1053, 1057 n.3 (9th Cir. i999)).
89 In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F3d at 130.
90 Id. at 132.
91 Id.
92 Andrews & Kurth L.L.P. v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc.), 157
F3d 414 (5th Cit. 1998).
93 Id. at 416. Involuntary bankruptcy proceedings are governed by section 303 of the
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interim Chapter 7 trustee on August 3 1, 1995.94 Shortly thereafter, Pro-Snax
Distributors converted the case to Chapter I, and on October i6, 1995 the
court appointed a permanent Chapter i i bankruptcy trustee to oversee
administration of the case.95 The debtor filed a plan of reorganization with
the court; however, the court refused to confirm the reorganization plan
based upon the objections of certain creditors.96 Thereafter, the creditors
petitioned successfully to have the case reconverted to a Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding.97 The debtor's attorneys, Andrews & Kurth, filed a
fee application with the bankruptcy court seeking payment of over $55,000
in fees and expenses for its representation of the debtor after the filing of
the involuntary bankruptcy petition against it.9s The creditors maintained
that the fees paid to the law firm should not be granted first priority as
administrative expenses because such preferential treatment was barred
by statute.99 The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Andrews & Kurth on
its fee application and awarded the firm its fees for the entire period that
the case was in Chapter i i, including the time billed after the trustee was
appointed, and for the time after the case was reconverted to a Chapter
7 proceeding.- The creditors then filed an appeal in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which reversed the
bankruptcy court's decision, holding that fees could not be awarded for
the time after the Chapter i i trustee had been appointed by the court.'0'
The district court held that the statute expressly precluded compensation
of attorneys after the appointment of a trustee, and remanded the case to
the bankruptcy court to determine whether the fees awarded to Andrews
& Kurth before the appointment of the Chapter i i trustee resulted in a
material and tangible benefit to the bankruptcy estate.'0 2
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.,°3  It first
addressed Andrews & Kurth's argument that the 1994 Act's removal of "the
debtor's attorney" from the list of professionals entitled to compensation
from the bankruptcy estate was inadvertent because such a sweeping
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code would have been discussed in the
Bankruptcy Code. See i i U.S.C. § 303 (2oo6).
94 Family Snacks, 157 F3d at 416.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 416-I7.
97 Id. at 417.
98 Id.
99 Id.
ioo In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc., 204 B.R. 492,493,497 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
1o Family Snacks, Inc. v. Andrews & Kurth, L.L.P. (In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc.), 212
B.R. 834, 837-39 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
102 Id. at 839.
103 Andrews & Kurth L.L.P. v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc.), 157
E3d 414,426 (5th Cir. 1998).
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Act's legislative history, and in fact the legislative history was silent on the
issue.04 Andrews & Kurth cited both the Second Circuit's decision in In
re Ames Department Stores, Inc05 and the preeminent bankruptcy treatise,
Collier on Bankruptcy,' 6 in support of its position.107
The Fifth Circuit refused to examine the legislative history, however,
stating that the statute was clear on its face and excluded attorneys from
its catalog of compensable officers.' s "Although the legislative history
and, indeed, a brief syntactical evaluation of the clause at issue suggest
that Congress inadvertently neglected to include attorneys, our canons
of construction do not require-nay, do not permit-us to consider these
exogenous sources when the statute is clear textually on its face."'' 9
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and
precluded Andrews & Kurth's application for attorneys' fees as a first
priority administrative expense from the debtor's bankruptcy estate."0
The following year, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit in
holding that a debtor's attorneys' fees were not entitled to priority treatment
under the Bankruptcy Code." In Inglesby, Falligant, Home, Courington &
Nash, PC. v. Moore (In re American Steel Product, Inc.), the debtor, American
Steel Product, Inc., was forced into an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding." 2 The case was then converted to a Chapter ii proceeding and
later reconverted to a Chapter 7 proceeding."13 Originally, American Steel
Product acted as debtor-in-possession, but when the case was converted to
a Chapter i i proceeding, a trustee was appointed and remained as trustee
io4 Id. at 421.
1o5 In reAmes Dep't Stores, Inc., 76 E3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1996).
io6 Family Snacks, 157 F3d at 421 (the court further discussed the deletion by examining
former sections of Collier on Bankruptcy, noting "[blecause the change is inconsistent with
current case law and the legislative history of § 330 does not support such drastic change,
courts should construe the deletion as unintended").
107 Family Snacks, 157 F3d at 42 1.
io8 Id. at 425.
1o9 Id. (emphasis added).
io Id. at 426. The Fifth Circuit also decided the standard to be applied in determining
whether Andrews & Kurth's fees for services rendered before the trustee was appointed were
entitled to priority. Id. Andrews & Kurth had argued that the standard should be whether
the services were "objectively beneficial toward the completion of the case at the time they
were performed." Id. Conversely, the creditors argued that the appropriate standard to be
used was whether the services "resulted in an identifiable, tangible, and material benefit to
the bankruptcy estate." Id. (citing In re Melp, Ltd., 179 B.R. 636,640 (E.D. Mo. 1995)). The
court determined that the stricter "material benefit" test was the appropriate measure to be
used. Family Snacks, 157 E3d at 426.
I I i See Inglesby, Falligant, Horne, Courington & Nash, P.C. v. Moore (In re Am. Steel
Prod., Inc.), 197 F3d 1354, 1357 (11 th Cir. 1999).
112 Id. at 1355.
113 See id.
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after the case was converted back to a Chapter 7.114 The Inglesby firm
submitted its fee application to the bankruptcy court upon the conclusion
of the proceedings, and the court refused to pay the firm's fees out of
the bankruptcy estate, holding that section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code
precluded a debtor's attorney from being granted an administrative priority
for its fees in a Chapter 7 or i I proceeding."15 The district court affirmed
the bankruptcy court's decision, and the case was appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit. The court refused to follow the Inglesby firm's suggestion that
section 330 contained a drafting error because it allowed for attorneys'
fees as a first priority administrative expense only in Chapter 12 and 13
proceedings." 6 In doing so, the court stated, "Where the statute's language
is plain, as here, our sole function is to enforce it according to its terms."
'
1
7
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit denied the Inglesby firm's petition to
have its fees paid as a first priority administrative expense. s
The final court of appeals case holding that debtors' attorneys' fees are
not entitled to administrative priority was the Fourth Circuit's decision
in United States Trustee v. Equipment Services, Inc. (In re Equipment Services,
Inc.). ' 9 In the case, Equipment Services filed a Chapter i i bankruptcy
proceeding and retained John Lamie, an attorney, to prepare its bankruptcy
petition and represent the company during its Chapter i i proceedings.'
20
Lamie received a retainer and represented Equipment Services as debtor-
in-possession. Approximately three months later, upon the motion of
the United States Trustee, the bankruptcy court converted the Chapter
i i proceeding to a Chapter 7 proceeding and appointed an administrator.
Lamie continued to represent Equipment Services after the conversion.' 2 '
Upon the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding, Lamie filed a fee
application for his work while the case was in Chapter i i and after it was
converted to Chapter 7. The trustee objected to the fees earned while the
case was in Chapter 7 because the application for fees did not specify that
the bankruptcy estate benefited from Lamie's services.12
114 Id.
115 Inglesby, Falligant, Home, Courington & Nash, P.C. v. Moore (In reAm. Steel Prod.,
Inc.), No. 96-60525, 1997 WL 33475574, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 1, 1997).
116 Inglesby, Falligant, Home, Courington & Nash, P.C. v. Moore (In re Am. Steel Prod.,
Inc.), 197 F3d 1354, 1356 (1 ith Cir. 1999).
117 Id. at 1357 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
i18 Moore, 197 F3d at 1357.
I19 U.S. Tr. v. Equip. Servs., Inc. (In re Equip. Servs., Inc.), 290 F3d 739, 742 (4th Cir.
2002).
120 Id. at 742.
121 Lamie's services after the case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding included
amending the debtor's asset schedules, appearing at hearings on adversary matters, and moni-
toring the debtor's post-petition assets and debts. Id. at 743.
122 Id. at 742-43. The trustee did not object to Lamie's fees for the period that he rep-
resented Equipment Services as debtor-in-possession, because those fees were authorized
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Like the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits before it, the Fourth Circuit
found that the plain language of section 33o(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
clearly omits a debtor's attorney from the ambit of that section, and
therefore any consideration of the amendment's legislative history would
be inappropriate.23 The Court stated that, if the statute was a result of
a scrivener's error, it was up to Congress to correct it, noting "[b]ecause
the plain language of § 33o(a) as it is now written is unambiguous and is
reasonable in application, we are constrained to enforce the language as
written." ,14
After the Fourth Circuit handed down its decision in Equipment Services,
the corporation's attorney, John Lamie, appealed the decision to the United
States Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorari to resolve the growing
conflict among the circuits.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN LAMIE
In Lamie v. United States Trustee,'12 5 the Supreme Court resolved the issue
of whether a debtor's attorney can receive compensation from the debtor's
Chapter 7 estate as a first priority administrative expense under section
330 of the Bankruptcy Code.12 6 The Court held that section 330 must be
read plainly and that Congress's deletion of the phrase "or the debtor's
attorney" from the statute must be enforced as written. 27
The Court began its analysis by identifying the differences between the
wording of section 330 under the 1978 statute and its 1994 amendment.12s
The Court noted that the phrase "or to the debtor's attorney" had been
deleted in 1994 and that the provision as rewritten had grammatical issues
stemming from the missing word "or" before "a professional person."129
by the court under section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 747. For a more in-depth
discussion of section 327, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. See also infra notes
iz6 - 144 and accompanying text.
123 In re Equip. Servs. Inc., 29o F3d at 745.
124 Id. at 745-46. It should be noted that the Fourth Circuit allowed Lamie's fees while
the case was in Chapter i i to be paid out of the bankruptcy estate because he served as at-
torney for the debtor-in-possession, which benefited the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 747.
125 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
126 In Lamie, the Supreme Court noted that an attorney could be compensated for her
legal work in a bankruptcy proceeding as an administrative priority expense under section 327
of the Bankruptcy Code if the attorney was hired by the trustee on behalf of the estate, and
not for the benefit of the debtor or any individual creditor. Id. at 529; see also i I U.S.C. § 327
(2oo6). Lamie acknowledged that he was not appointed by the trustee to render services on
behalf of the estate; accordingly, his fee application was not eligible for first priority treatment
under section 327. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 529.
127 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538-39.
128 Id. at 529-3o.
129 Id.; see also supra notes 39-4o and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court stated, "The deletion created an apparent legislative
drafting error. It left current § 33o(a)(I) with a missing 'or' that infects its
grammar." 130 Moreover, the Court explained that "the Act's inclusion of the
word 'attorney' in § 33o(a)(i)(A) defeats the neat parallelism that otherwise
marks the relationship between § § 33o(a)(I) and 33o(a)(I)(A)." ,31
The Court then established that under its general rule of statutory
construction, if a statute is plain on its face, the sole purpose of the courts
is to enforce the statute in accordance with its terms, unless enforcing the
statute as written would lead to an absurd result.32 The Court explained
that, even if "[tihe statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical," the
statute must still be read in accordance with the plain meaning rule.' 33
Addressing the substance of Lamie's claim, the Court held that a
debtor's attorney was simply not listed in section 33o(a) as a party who
could receive compensation from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate as a
priority claimant, unless the attorney's fees fell within the ambit of section
327.'34 The Court also explained that the "missing conjunction 'or"' would
make a difference only if it affected the substance of the Act or obscured its
meaning.'35 Because the missing conjunction merely rendered the statute
awkward, without changing its underlying meaning, the grammatical error
was irrelevant to the outcome of the case. 36
The Court added that enforcing the statute as written would not produce
absurd results because a debtor's attorney has other avenues to receive
compensation for her services.' 37 For example, attorneys for a debtor in
Chapter 12 and 13 proceedings would continue to receive their fees as
administrative priority expenses under section 33o(a)(4)(B) of the Code,
which was added as part of the 1994 amendments.13 In addition, attorneys
13o Lamie, 540 U.S. at 529-30.
131 Id. at 530; see also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
132 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534 (citing Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank,
N.A., 530 U.S. i, 6 (2ooo)). The Court also noted that "the starting point in discerning con-
gressional intent is the existing statutory text, and not the predecessor statutes." Lamie, 540
U.S. at 534 (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,438 (1999)).
133 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534.
134 Id. The Court reasoned that it was irrelevant whether a debtor's attorney was listed
in section 33o(a)()(a) because the Court's analysis did not reach that section until it was es-
tablished that the debtor's attorney was in the class of persons set forth in section 33o(a)(I).
Id.
135 Id. at 534-35.
136 Id. The Court conceded that the reference to an attorney in section 33o(a)(l)(A)
was "surplusage" under its interpretation of the statute. It noted, however, that while canons
of statutory construction suggest that statutes should be construed to avoid surplusage, those
canons were not absolute. Id. at 536 (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84,
94 (zooi)).
137 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 537.
138 Id. at 537 ("In a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual,
the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor's attorney."); see also supra note 42
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for Chapter 7 debtors could receive administrative priority treatment if they
are appointed by the trustee under section 327.' 39 It concluded that, even
though the interpretation of the statute might lead to a harsh outcome,
such a reading was necessary to give proper deference to the legislative
process.140
Although the Court stated that it was not necessary to look to the
statute's legislative history because the statute was plain on its face, it
nevertheless examined it, concluding that although it was plausible that
the deletion of the debtor's attorney phrase was a mistake,' 4' it was also
plausible that it was intentional.42 Accordingly, the Court determined that
the statute's legislative history was not helpful in resolving the issue beforeit.,143
Finding that Lamie was not entitled to administrative priority treatment
for his attorneys' fees in Equipment Services' Chapter 7 proceeding, the
Court held that "§ 33o(a)(I) does not authorize compensation awards
to debtors' attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as
authorized by § 327. If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under
§ 33o(a)(I ) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and
approved by the court." 144 The Court suggested that, if Congress intended
and accompanying text.
139 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 537.
140 Id. at 538 (citing United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84,95 (1985)).
141 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534. The Court explained that in the legislative history of section
33o(a)(I)(A), it is clear that the primary reason for deleting language from that section was be-
cause the provision granting the government's right to object to a fee application was moved
to new section 33o(a)(2). Id. at 539-40 (citing S. REP. No. 103-168 (993)). Thus, it was pos-
sible that Congress may have deleted too many words from that section during the course of
moving the objection provisions. In such a case, the deletion of "or to the debtor's attorney"
from section 33o(a)( )(A) could have been a mistake. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 540.
142 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 540. The Court suggested that the amendment that deleted a
portion of section 33o(a)(l)(a) and added section 33o(a)(2) was part of an attempt by Congress
to curb abuses in awarding professional fees. See 140 CONG. REC. S14597-o (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1994) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). Therefore, deleting the debtor's attorney from the
list of administrative priority claimants could advance that purpose. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 540.
Moreover, at the same time that Congress deleted "or to the debtor's attorney" from section
33o(a)(i), it added language in section 33o(a)(4)(B) that provided administrative priority to
a debtor's attorneys' fees in a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, the
Court concluded, Congress could have intended to continue priority treatment to attorneys
in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 proceedings despite the statute's broad exclusion of debtors'
attorneys from the list of compensable professionals in section 33o(a)(i). Id. at 541.
143 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 540-41. "There is a basic difference between filling a gap left
by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically en-
acted." Id. at 538 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,625 (1978)).
144 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538-39. The Supreme Court concluded its opinion by stating
that, although the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys brought the 1994
change to the attention of Congress during its deliberations, the Association did not object to
the change. Congress went on to pass the statute unchanged. Id. at 541. For cases following
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a different result, it was up to Congress to amend the statute to conform it
to legislative intent.
45
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRIORITY: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Whether the Supreme Court reached the correct result in Lamie and,
indeed, whether the Bankruptcy Code itself is flawed in its treatment of
priority claims turns on the proper scope and purpose of the administrative
priority. This section examines the history of the priority rules, together
with their underlying policy justifications. Concluding that section 330 of
the Bankruptcy Code, as it is currently drafted, deviates from the historical
purpose and policy behind the administrative priority, this Article offers a
modest proposal for change.
A. The History and Policy Underlying First Priority Administrative Expenses
Since 1841, courts have recognized the importance of granting special
priority to expenses that directly benefit the bankruptcy estate. 46 Both
bankruptcy statutes and court decisions since that time have consistently
allowed debtors' attorneys' fees as administrative priority expenses only if
they provide an express benefit to the bankruptcy estate or to the debtor's
unsecured creditors. Thus, in order to evaluate whether section 330 of the
Bankruptcy Code properly defines the scope of the administrative priority,
it is imperative to examine the history and policy underlying this priority.
1. The Bankruptcy Act of1800.- The first major bankruptcy act in the United
States was the Bankruptcy Act of I8oo.' 47 For the most part, it followed
English bankruptcy law and provided only for involuntary bankruptcy.
48
Under the Act, all creditors who duly proved their debts received a pro rata
share of the debtor's assets, with no priority accorded to one creditor over
another.149 Congress repealed the Act after three years because it was too
difficult for the average person to bring his case and witnesses to the distant
Lamie, see Redmond v. Lentz & Clark, P.A. (In reWagers), 514 F3d 1021, 1026-27 (ioth Cir.
2007), and In reWeinschneider, 395 F3d 401,403-04 (7th Cir. 2005).
145 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 542 ("It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its draft-
ling errors, and to provide for what we might think ... is the preferred result.") (quoting
United States v. Granderson, 5 1 U.S. 39, 68 (1994)).
146 See infra notes 155 - 188 and accompanying text.
147 Bankruptcy Act of 18oo, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealedby Act of Dec. i9, 1803, ch. 6, z
Stat. 248; 1 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
14 (3d ed. 1923).
148 I FRANK 0. LOVELAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY § 5
(4th ed. 1912).
149 Bankruptcy Act of 18oo, ch. 19, 2 Stat 19 §§ 29-30 (18oo), repealedby Act of Dec. 19.
1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat 248 (1803).
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federal courts in the early 18oos. '50
2. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841.- When Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act
of 1841,'5' it included both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy ' s5 and, for
the first time, recognized "the justice of granting to the honest debtor... a
discharge and release from his remaining debts."15 3 It was repealed less than
two years later for the same reason as the Bankruptcy Act of i8oo: access to
bankruptcy courts was extremely limited for the average person.'
s4
The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 again provided for a pro rata distribution of
the debtor's assets to creditors with bona fide debts, but, for the first time,
it granted priority to a small number of debts, including debts owed to the
government, debts held by sureties, and wage claims up to twenty-five
dollars.'Ss
The first case to address the issue of whether attorneys' fees were
entitled to priority treatment in bankruptcy was ExparteHale,56 which was
decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. In Hale, the debtor's attorneys
assisted the debtor in filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition and were able
to secure a discharge of his debts as a result.' s5 At the conclusion of the
bankruptcy proceeding, the attorneys sought to collect their fees from the
assets of the estate as a priority claim.151
The court rejected the attorneys' claim, holding that their labor
benefited only the debtor, and therefore he should be responsible for
150 REMINGTON, supra note 147, at 14-15; WILLIAM H. OPPENHEIMER, BRANDENBURG ON
BANKRUPTCY § 6 (4th ed. Chicago, Callaghan 1917).
151 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 44o, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5
Stat. 614.
152 LOVELAND, supra note 148, § 6, at io.
153 REMINGTON, supra note 147, at 15; see Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 9.
154 LOVELAND, supra note 148, § 6, at 12-13.
155 Section 5 of the Act provides:
And be it further enacted, That [sic] all creditors coming in and
proving their debts under such bankruptcy, in the manner hereinafter
prescribed, the same being bona fide debts, shall be entitled to share
in the bankrupt's property and effects, pro rata, without any priority or
preference whatsoever, except only for debts due by such bankrupt to
the United States, and for all debts due by him to persons who, by the
laws of the United States, have a preference, in consequence of having
paid moneys as his sureties, which shall be first paid out of the assets;
and any person who shall have performed any labor as an operative in
the service of any bankrupt shall be entitled to receive the full amount of
the wages due to him for such labor, not exceeding twenty-five dollars.
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 5.
i56 Exparte Hale, II F. Cas. 178 (C.C.D.N.H. 1842).
157 Id. at 179.
I58 Id.
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paying the fees.159
I can perceive no ground, upon which payment can be decreed therefor
out of the assets of the bankrupt. They were incurred for his sole personal
benefit, and not for the benefit or at the instance of his creditors. He, and
he only, therefore, ought to bear them. It would, or at least might, have
been different, if the costs and expenses had been incurred by a creditor in
prosecuting a petition against a bankrupt, in invitum, to have him decreed a
bankrupt; for then and in such a case the proceedings and decree might be
said to be for the benefit of all the creditors. But, here, there is no ground
upon which the court can say that the costs and expenses are to be a charge
upon the assets in bankruptcy. ,60
Thus, Hale is an important case because it represents the first instance
in which a court would establish that a debtor's attorneys' fees were entitled
to priority treatment only to the extent that they benefited the bankruptcy
estate.
3. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867.- The Bankruptcy Act of 1867,16, which
lasted eleven years, was a pivotal piece of legislation because it was the first
act to establish a full priority system for the distribution of a debtor's assets
in bankruptcy.162 The Act's priority scheme granted first priority status to
the administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate.' 63 It provided: "In
the order for a dividend, under this section, the following claims shall be
entitled to priority or preference, and to be first paid in full in the following
order: First. The fees, costs, and expenses of suits, and the several
proceedings in bankruptcy under this act, and for the custody of property,
as herein provided." ,64
The Act suffered from three major structural problems. First, critics
argued that it was too easy for creditors to force a debtor into bankruptcy
involuntarily.' 65 Second, it was too difficult for the debtor to obtain a
discharge of his debts after being forced into bankruptcy.' 66 Finally, the Act
allowed bankruptcy attorneys and court officers to obtain excessive fees in
debtors' bankruptcy proceedings. 67
159 Id.
i6o Id.
161 Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. i6o,
20 Stat. 99.
162 LOVELAND, supra note 148, § 7, at 12.
163 Bankruptcy Act of 1867 § 28.
164 Id.
165 REMINGTON, supra note 147, at 16.
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., In re Oakland Lumber Co., 174 E 634, 637 (2d Cir. 19o9) ("Nothing contrib-
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Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, courts did, however, draw a distinction
between the attorneys for the debtor and the attorneys for the estate when
examining whether their fees were entitled to priority under the statute.
For example, in In re Handell,'6 the court refused to grant administrative
priority status to the debtor's attorneys' fees for the preparation and filing
of his bankruptcy petition and schedules.' 69 The court concluded that the
administrative priority provision "has been construed to include only the
costs due the register, clerk, marshal, and assignee; and not any expenses
incurred by the bankrupt, or for services rendered by attorneys for the
bankrupt in preparing the petition and schedules of the bankrupt.
'170
In addition, some courts made a distinction between debtors' attorneys'
fees incurred before the bankruptcy petition was filed, and those incurred
after the filing of the petition. In general, courts held that the former fees
were not entitled to administrative priority, but the latter could be granted
administrative priority treatment if they benefited the bankruptcy estate or
unsecured creditors.' 7' For example, the court in In reJaycox held: "In order
to justify an order that the assignee pay such claim [as an administrative
priority], it must be clearly shown that the alleged services were properly
and necessarily rendered for the purpose of benefiting or preserving the
estate of the bankrupts, in the interest of the general creditors, and not in
the interest of any creditor or class of creditors." 
72
A small number of courts, however, granted administrative priority to the
full amount of the debtor's attorneys' fees, even if those fees were incurred
to prepare the debtor's bankruptcy petition. These courts reasoned that
the debtor was entitled to keep very little property as exempt, and the
exempt property that the debtor did retain was insufficient to cover his
attorneys' fees.' 73
uted so much to bring about the repeal of the act of 1867 as the large expense of administra-
tion, the small estates being entirely absorbed in fees."); In re Wells, 114 E 222, 224 (W.D.
Mo. 19o2) ("The act of 1867 carried with it many evils, real or supposed. One of such evils
was its oppressive and expensive features. The estates were eaten up by a most vicious fee
system. The litigation was all or practically all, in the federal courts, generally sitting at a great
distance from the debtor, the claimants, and the witnesses. It was the purpose of the present
statute [1898] to correct this, and limit the fees and expenses, and have the greater part of
the litigation where the parties resided."); see also In re Beck, 92 F. 889, 892 (S.D. Iowa 1899)
("One of the strongest objections urged against the bankruptcy statute of 1867 was what was
claimed by many to be the excessive fees possible thereunder, in whose payment the estate
was largely consumed, leaving to the creditors little, if any, desirable dividends.").
168 In re Handell, i i F. Cas. 420 (W.D. Tex. 1876).
169 Idat 420.
170 Id.
171 In rJaycox, 13 F Cas. 398,399 (N.D.N.Y. 1873).
172 Id.
173 In In reComstock, 6 E Cas. 239 (W.D. Mich. 1870, the court stated:
When a party is declared bankrupt in a proceeding in invitum, a war-
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Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, courts had a difficult hurdle to
overcome before even reaching the priority issue because of the Supreme
Court's General Order No. 30. The Order stated that "no allowance shall
be made against the estate of the bankrupt for fees of attorneys, solicitors, or
counsel, except when necessarily employed by the assignee, when the same
may be allowed as disbursements." ,74 Accordingly, attorneys' fees incurred
to prepare a debtor's bankruptcy petition and accompanying schedules were
not entitled to an administrative priority under General Order No. 3o, even
if the services resulted in some benefit to the creditors of the bankruptcy
estate.'75 Thus, while some cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act of
1867 allowed reasonable compensation for a debtor's attorney, that practice
was abrogated by the Supreme Court's pronouncement in General Order
No. 30.176
rant issues at once to the marshal to take possession of the bankrupt's
property and effects; he is thereby deprived of all control over his estate,
save such as is exempt; he is practically without means with which to pay
his attorneys for services in defending against the petition. The amount
which the bankrupt gets by exemption is, in most cases, trifling, and in
no case is it so much but that he or his family are dependent for support
on his personal efforts and earnings....
... I will not believe, nor will I hold, that congress [sic] intended to
deprive a party of the right to have enough of his own property appropri-
ated to his use, to enable him to contest the doubtful questions which
may be, and frequently are, involved as to the charge of acts of bank-
ruptcy.
Id. at 240. See also In re Olds, 18 F Cas. 644, 644 (W.D. Mich. 1870) (holding that the estate
should pay the debtors' costs from assets of the estate, noting that "[tihe bankrupts having, by
force of law, surrendered all their property to be disposed of for the benefit of their creditors,
it seems just and right that the avails of such property shall, so far as necessary, be used to
give the bankrupts that relief when, upon conformity to the requirements of the law, they are
entitled to claim, viz., a discharge from their debts").
174 In re Gies, 1o F Cas. 339,340 (E.D. Mich. 1875).
175 In re Hamburger, i i E Cas. 317,317 (S.D.N.Y. 1875) ("The principle adopted by the
register is, that the services for which he thinks an allowance should be made were more or
less beneficial to the creditors and the assignee, and were services proper and necessary to be
rendered, on the procurement of the bankrupts. This would be a very proper consideration
were it not for the express language of general order No. 30, which was manifestly intended to
exclude the exercise of all discretion by the court in cases of this kind.").
176 In In re Lloyd, 7 F 459 (W.D. Pa. 1881), the court stated:
"It is a settled rule in this court never to allow counsel on either side
to be paid out of the funds in dispute." In the spirit of this rule, and to
guard against abuses which threatened to creep into the administration
of the bankrupt law, the supreme court [sic], as I conceive, so amended
the general orders in bankruptcy as to put an end to allowances out of
the bankrupt's estate to the petitioning creditors' attorneys, solicitors,
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4. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898.- The precursor to current bankruptcy law
was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.177 Section 64 of the Act addressed the
issue of priority, and granted first priority to the actual and necessary costs
of preserving the estate after the bankruptcy filing.'17 The main purpose
of the 1898 Act was to allow for equitable distribution of the debtor's estate
among creditors, with priority being given to one creditor over another only
when the purpose of the priority was clear from the statute.'
79
The Act granted third priority to attorneys' fees in involuntary
bankruptcies, but provided that, in voluntary bankruptcies, the court
or counsel.
Id. at 46o-61 (quoting Hauenstien v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 491 (1879)) (citation omitted).
Some lower courts, however, carved out an exception to General Order No. 30 for services
rendered by the debtor's attorney that clearly benefited the bankruptcy estate. See In re Beck,
92 F 889, 892 (S.D. Iowa 1899). In Beck, the court stated:
If, meanwhile, legal services are actually needed for preservation of the
property, pending the appointment of the trustee, and such necessity
clearly appears, and, as well, that such services were rendered which
were beneficial to the general creditors .... this court is authorized to
allow a reasonable fee therefor. In other words, fees for legal services
rendered for [the] bankrupt... in proceedings instituted by the bank-
rupt for his own benefit, will not be allowed as a debt having the priority
given under the clause under consideration. Such fee, if allowable at all,
must be presented as a claim against the estate, and take its place with
other general claims. But, if legal services are rendered under circum-
stances and of a nature which constitute a special benefit to the estate
generally,... the court may allow therefor, when such necessity and
benefit clearly appear.
Id. at 892.
177 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
178 Section 64 stated, in pertinent part:
(a) The court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes legally due and
owing by the bankrupt to the United States, State, county, district, or
municipality in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and
upon filing the receipts of the proper public officers for such payment
he shall be credited with the amount thereof, and in case any question
arises as to the amount or legality of any such tax the same shall be heard
and determined by the court.
(b) The debts to have priority, except as herein provided, and to be paid
in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment shall be
(i) the actual and necessary cost of preserving the estate subsequent to
filing the petition ....
§ 64 (headings & footnote omitted).
179 See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952); Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, z8o U.S.
224, 227 (1930).
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should use its discretion in whether to grant third priority for the fees of
the debtor's attorney.'s° The rationale for this distinction appeared to be
twofold: first, in an involuntary proceeding, the debtor did not choose to
file for bankruptcy protection, and therefore had no control over whether
to incur attorneys' fees; and second, if the debtor's property was sold by
the trustee for the benefit of creditors, the debtor would have no assets
remaining with which to pay his attorney.''
Under the 1898 Act, administrative expenses were granted first priority
because the estate was required to pull its own weight. In doing so, the Act
stated, "The costs of the administration of an estate are always chargeable
against the assets of the estate." '82 Moreover, bankruptcy law "expressly
provides for the cost of administration as a prior lien upon the assets of the
bankrupt's estate before there is any distribution of it to creditors." 13
The leading case discussing the priority afforded attorneys' fees under
the 1898 Act was In re Erie Lumber Company. I 4 Erie involved an attorney
who represented a debtor in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. The
court held that the attorney's fees were part of the cost of administering the
estate. "[T]he professional services of attorneys are essential to the proper
administration of a bankrupt's estate, and are second only in dignity to the
wages of labor exerted in its creation."'
' 15
i8o Section 64 provided for third priority in the following situations:
(3) [Tihe cost of administration, including the fees and mileage payable
to witnesses as now or hereafter provided by the laws of the United
States, and one reasonable attorney's fee, for the professional services
actually rendered, irrespective of the number of attorneys employed, to
the petitioning creditors in involuntary cases, to the bankrupt in invol-
untary cases while performing the duties herein prescribed, and to the
bankrupt in voluntary cases, as the court may allow ....
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 64; see also Beck, 92 E at 89o .
181 Beck, 92 F. at 89o-91.
182 In reTebo, 'o E 419, 420 (D.W. Va. 19oo).
183 Id. Tebo directly addressed the issue of compensation to the attorney of a debtor
out of the property of the estate, even though that issue was never appealed. "The court is
of opinion that the allowance to counsel [for the debtor] rests largely in the discretion of the
referee in bankruptcy, and, there being no evidence filed before the judge of this court that
the allowance made by the referee was unjust, excessive, and exorbitant, I am of opinion not
to disturb it.... Id. at 42 1. State bankruptcy law was also greatly affected by the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. John Deere Plow Co. v. McDavid (In ,r John Deere Plow Co.), 137 F. 802, 812
(8th Cir. 1905) established the principle that state preferences could not interfere with federal
preferences.
184 In re Erie Lumber Co., I5o F. 817 (S.D. Ga. 19o6).
185 Id. at 825.
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5. The Chandler Act Amendments.- The Chandler Act amended the
priority section of the Bankruptcy Code significantly, specifically allowing
trustees to recover their fees in opposing the bankruptcy discharge as an
administrative priority. One of the most significant changes, however,
allowed attorneys for debtors in voluntary bankruptcy proceedings to
recover their fees as administrative priority expenses as well.'16 In order
to receive priority, the fees had to arise during the administration of the
bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, generally only post-petition expenses were
granted administrative priority treatment. ,87 The attorneys seeking priority
had the burden of establishing that their fees fell within the intended class
of priority claimants and benefited the bankruptcy estate. '
6. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.- Beginning in 1978, the claims that
were entitled to priority treatment were enumerated much more clearly in the
Bankruptcy Code.'8 9 First priority claims included primarily administrative
expenses specified in section 503(b).'- ° As established in Part I of this
186 Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978). The amendments pro-
vided, in pertinent part:
a. The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends
to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order
of payment, shall be (i) the actual and necessary costs and expenses of
preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition; the filing fees
paid by creditors in involuntary cases; where property of the bankrupt,
transferred or concealed by him either before or after the filing of the
petition, shall have been recovered for the benefit of the estates of the
bankrupt by the efforts and at the cost and expense of one or more credi-
tors, the reasonable costs and expenses of such recovery; the costs and
expenses of administration, including the trustee's expenses in oppos-
ing the bankrupt's discharge, the fees and mileage payable to witnesses
as now or hereafter provided by the laws of the United States, and one
reasonable attorney's fee, for the professional services actually rendered,
irrespective of the number of attorneys employed, to the petitioning
creditors in involuntary cases and to the bankrupt in voluntary and in-
voluntary cases, as the court may allow ....
§ 64.
187 See, e.g., In re Fuzzy Thurston's Eau Claire Left Guard, Inc., 33 B.R. 579, 581 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1983).
188 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. REA Express, Inc. (In re REA Express, Inc.), 442
E Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). It is also important to note that, in pre-1978 cases, although
the priority section was included in what is now the Chapter 7 provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, they have been held equally applicable in Chapter iI proceedings. Id. "The purpose
of according first priority to administrative expenses in a Chapter XI proceeding is to encour-
age current employees and current suppliers to deal with the debtor while it is attempting to
survive and arrive at an arrangement as provided by law." Id. at 74.
189 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
190 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1978) (current version at i i U.S.C. 507 (2006)). Under the
1978 Code, attorneys who were unsuccessful in receiving administrative priority treatment
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Article, section 503(b) included compensation and reimbursements that
were awarded under section 330 of the Code.' g' For the first time, debtors'
attorneys' fees were granted first priority treatment irrespective of whether
their services conferred any specific benefit on the bankruptcy estate.
"The debtor's attorney is included among the professionals compensated
under section 330 on the theory that his services, while not performed for
the direct benefit of the estate, may be helpful to the bankruptcy process
because they facilitate orderly administration of the estate.'192
Yet despite this radical change in the treatment of attorneys' fees in
bankruptcy, some remnants of pre-I978 policy still remained. For example,
courts facing the issue of whether contingent attorneys' fees could be
treated as administrative expenses were reluctant to allow them because
they did not benefit the bankruptcy estate. One court stated that "[s]uch a
result would flatly contradict the policy reason for granting administrative
expense priorities, which is that the estate as a whole is benefited if general
creditors subordinate their pre-bankruptcy claims in order to secure goods
and services necessary to an orderly and economical administration of the
estate after the petition is filed." 193
7. The 1994 Amendments.- As discussed in part I, the 1994 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code' 94 significantly altered the priority granted to a debtor's
attorneys' fees in bankruptcy. The amendments deleted the debtor's
attorney from the list of parties entitled to administrative priority treatment
under section 33o(a)(i).'g9 Although the amendments made to the Code in
1994 amended section 330 dramatically, the purpose of the administrative
priority remained the same: to allow parties whose services benefited the
bankruptcy estate to be paid ahead of other creditors. 96 Moreover, because
for their fees in representing the debtor often sought to establish their fees as third priority
expenses for "wages, salaries, or commissions." § 507(a)(3); see also In re Hutchison, 223 B.R.
586, 588 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
191 II U.S.C. § 507(a)(i) (current version at i i U.S.C. 507 (2oo6)). "Section 330 is de-
signed to secure for the estate the services of competent professional persons, including a
trustee, an attorney for the trustee, accountants, appraisers, and others who may be needed
in order best to operate, reorganize, or liquidate the estate." Yermakov v. Fitzsimmons (In re
Yermakov), 718 Fzd 1465, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 40-41 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5826-27); see also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying
text.
192 Yermakov, 718 F.zd at 1470. "Because 'economy in administration is the basic objec-
tive,' Section 330 limits the compensation payable to the debtor's attorney as well as other
professionals to a reasonable amount for 'actual' services that are 'necessary' in connection
with the bankruptcy process." Id. (citation omitted).
193 Id. (citing Hall v. Perry (In re Chochise Coll. Park, Inc.), 703 Fd 1339, 1355-56 (9th
Cir. 1983)).
194 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 1o8 Stat. 41o6 (1994).
195 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
196 See, e.g., Pope v. Vu (In re Vu), 366 B.R. 51 1, 516-17 (D. Md. 2007); see also Xifaras v.
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every priority claim decreases the assets that are available to the debtor's
general unsecured creditors, courts have continued the tradition of strictly
construing priority claims in bankruptcy.'
97
B. Policy Justifications Underlying Priority Claims
When paying creditors' claims in bankruptcy, the Code starts with a
general presumption "favoring equality in distribution such that 'if one
claimant is to be preferred over others, the purpose should be clear from the
statute."'9 8 All of the priority rules in the Bankruptcy Code can be justified
on one of two policy grounds.' 99 Either the priority debts increase the value
of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all creditors, or they preserve the
social safety net provided by the government and, thus, benefit society as a
whole. A brief examination of the debts afforded priority treatment under
the Code serves to illustrate this point.
Domestic support obligations, such as child support, are granted first
priority treatment under the Bankruptcy Code.- ° This provision was added
in 2005 because Congress recognized that spouses and dependent children
often did not receive payments necessary for their survival when the payor
filed for bankruptcy protection." ' As a result, they were often forced to file
for bankruptcy themselves. Thus, the purpose behind affording domestic
support obligations first priority is to prevent this domino effect, thereby
easing the government's burden of providing for the welfare of spouses and
Morad (In re Morad), 328 B.R. 264, 271 (B.A.P. ist Cir. 2005).
197 In re Hutchison, 223 B.R. 586,588 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998). Attorneys have continued
to attempt to squeeze their claims within the ambit of section 507(a)(3) as wage claims if they
are denied first priority treatment as administrative expenses, but few have been successful
in doing so. "The key distinction entitling claimants to priority pursuant to § 507(a)(3) is
whether claimants are truly engaged in a master/servant relationship with the Debtor versus
those who are engaged in a contractual relationship with the Debtor." Id. It is important to
note that, if a case has been converted to Chapter 7 from Chapter H1, 12, or 13, then section
726 of the Code provides that administrative priority expenses arising in the Chapter 7 pro-
ceeding have priority over administrative expenses arising in the subsequent Chapter II, 12,
or 13 proceeding. I I U.S.C. § 726 (zoo6).
198 Total Minatome Corp. v.Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc. (In reJack/Wade Drilling, Inc.), 258
E3d 385,387-88 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952)).
199 Fora more complete discussion of the priority rules generally, see supra notes 31-36
and accompanying text.
200 i U.S.C. § 507(a)(i)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2oo8); see also H.R. REP. No. io9--3 i , pt. I,
at 16-17 (zoo5), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 102-03.
2o In the Senate debates on BAPCPA, one senator referred to debtors' failure to pay
child support obligations as one of the "worst abuses in the consumer bankruptcy system."
See 151 CONG. REc. E704-o3 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Moore); see also 151
CONG. REC. H1974-05 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Gingrey) ("Spousal and
child support protections ... help single parents and their children by closing a loophole used
by some spouses currently avoiding their child support responsibilities.").
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children of debtors.
Administrative expenses are granted second priority in bankruptcy. 2
As the previous discussion of the history of the administrative priority
demonstrates, this priority category is designed to encourage the trustee
and other professionals to work diligently to preserve and enhance the
value of the bankruptcy estate for all creditors. In addition, it recognizes
the need for the bankruptcy estate to pull its own weight.03 For example,
insurance needed to preserve estate assets is an administrative priority
expense, as are the fees for the trustee and other professionals working
with the trustee, such as appraisers and accountants for the estate. Thus,
the primary policy justification for the administrative priority is that the
expenses incurred thereunder enhance the value of the bankruptcy
estate for the benefit of all creditors. Courts have consistently held that
administrative priority expenses should be narrowly construed "to honor
'the traditional presumption favoring ratable distribution among all holders
of unsecured claims. ' 204
Third priority expenses include claims made by so-called involuntary
gap creditors. 0 5 When a debtor is forced into bankruptcy involuntarily by
the debtor's creditors, there is a period of time between the filing of the
involuntary petition and the hearing by the bankruptcy court to determine
whether the debtor properly belongs in bankruptcy. The intervening
period is called the involuntary gap period .206 If creditors are unwilling to
loan money or provide goods and services to the debtor during that period,
the debtor will surely be ready for bankruptcy at the end of the involuntary
gap period. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code seeks to encourage creditors
to deal with the debtor during this period by affording them third priority
treatment should the debtor ultimately stay in bankruptcy. Thus, the policy
justification for providing priority treatment to involuntary gap creditors is
to enhance the value of the bankruptcy estate by allowing the debtor to
continue its business operations during the gap period.
The fourth priority is reserved for employees of a debtor who provide
services within the 18o-day period before the bankruptcy petition is
filed.207 If employees' wages are protected should their employer be forced
202 1i U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (West Supp. 2008).
203 Xifaras v. Morad (In re Morad), 328 B.R. 264, 271 (B.A.P. ist Cir. zoo5 ) ("[Tlhe very
essence of an administrative expense under § 503(b)(i)(A) is that it arises during the admin-
istration of the estate.").
204 Id. at 269. See, e.g., Isaac v. Temex Energy, Inc. (In re Amarex, Inc.), 853 Ezd 1526,
1530 (ioth Cir. 1988); In re Pre-Press Graphics Co., 287 B.R. 726, 730 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 2003).
205 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (West Supp. 2oo8).
206 For a comprehensive discussion of the respective rights of creditors and debtors dur-
ing the involuntary gap period, see Joseph Mullin, Comment, Bridging the Gap: Defining the
Debtor's Status During the Involuntary Gap Period, 61 U. Cni. L. REV. 1091 (994).
207 11 U.S.C. § 5o7(a)(4) (West Supp. 2oo8). These claims are capped at $10,950 per
creditor. Id.
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to file for bankruptcy protection, they have more incentive to continue
working for a shaky company, thereby increasing the possibility that the
debtor will not need bankruptcy protection.z0a In addition, employees are
dependent on their employer to provide their livelihood and support their
families.z09 If the employer eventually files a bankruptcy petition, there
is a greater chance that employees might lose their jobs and be forced to
rely on welfare or the bankruptcy system to survive °10 Therefore, granting
employees' wages fourth priority in bankruptcy reduces the burden on the
government's social safety net.
The Bankruptcy Code provides fifth priority to claims for contributions
to employee benefit plans."' This priority protects retirement benefits in
bankruptcy, again reducing the obligation of the government to provide
support to individuals during their retirement.I'
Unsecured claims of certain farmers and fishermen are granted sixth
priority treatment in bankruptcy. Protecting the debts of those who supply
food to the country helps to ensure that farmers and fishermen will continue
their businesses, thereby relieving the government of the burden to feed
its citizens.
Seventh priority treatment is provided to individuals for deposits made
for purchasing, leasing, or renting property that has not yet been received as
of the time that the debtor files for bankruptcy, or for personal services that
have not yet been provided.2 ' 3 Because most of the debts falling within
this category are for security deposits for apartment rental, it is likely that
this priority protects the government against having to provide a safety net
for individuals who cannot afford to rent another apartment when their
landlord files for bankruptcy.
One of the largest categories of priority claims, the eighth priority, is
for taxes owed to governmental units214 These claims include income
taxes, property taxes, trust fund taxes, and penalties incurred before the
bankruptcy filing. It is no surprise that the purpose behind this priority is
to assist the government in collecting funds with which to provide welfare
and other social services to those in need throughout the country.
Ninth priority treatment is granted to claims by FDIC regulatory
agencies to maintain the capital of FDIC-insured banks and financial
zo8 See, e.g., In re Northwest Eng'g Co., 863 Fzd 1313, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1988).
209 See Daniel Keating, The Fruits of Labor: Worker Priorities in Bankruptcy, 35 ARmz. L.
REV. 905, 907 (1993).
210 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupty Policy, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 775,790 (1987) ("Employees
are among the creditors least likely to have spread the risks of default.").
211 iI U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (West Supp. 2oo8).
212 See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Plaid Pantries, Inc., 10 F3d 605, 607 (9th Cir.
1993), abrogated by Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651 (2oo6).
213 I1 U.S.C. § 5o7(a)(7) (West Supp. 2oo8).
214 Id. § 507(a)(8).
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institutions.215 This priority category, which was recently added to the
Bankruptcy Code, allows FDIC agencies to collect their claims ahead of
general unsecured creditors because, in the absence of priority treatment,
the claims would likely remain unpaid, putting a burden on the government
to satisfy the claims and thereby reducing the funds available to provide
welfare and other social service benefits.
The Bankruptcy Code grants tenth priority to death or personal injury
claims that arise because the debtor operated a motor vehicle or boat
unlawfully while intoxicated due to alcohol or drugs.2 6 This priority
category does not fit within either of the two general policy justifications for
priority claims generally. Presumably the intent behind granting priority
treatment to these claims is either to punish the debtor for illegal behavior
or to serve as a deterrent to such behavior. In either case, however, it can
be argued that these claims should not be granted priority treatment, but
such an argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
The following section examines whether debtors' attorneys' fees fall
within either of the generally accepted policy justifications for priority
claims generally. Concluding that they do not, it offers a modest proposal
for change.
C. A Proposalfor Amending the Administrative Priority Rules
For over I5O years, United States bankruptcy laws have consistently
provided that attorneys representing debtors in bankruptcy proceedings
are entitled to have their fees paid as administrative priority expenses only
if they can demonstrate a clear and substantial benefit to the bankruptcy
estate. 1a 7 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 sharply deviated from
that long-standing practice, however, by treating debtors' attorneys' fees
as administrative priority expenses without a showing that the services
benefited the estate.2 8 The Act offered no legislative history to support
such a dramatic change. Although some courts sought to narrow this broad
grant of priority for attorneys' fees, they were constrained by the statute's
express language. While both the 1994 Amendments and the Supreme
Court's decision in Lamie took important steps toward narrowing the ability
of debtors' attorneys to have their fees treated as administrative priority
expenses, many loopholes and difficult issues of statutory interpretation
remain.
Debtors' attorneys' fees generally do not enhance the value of the
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all creditors. Certainly there might
be instances in which the attorneys' services indirectly benefit the estate,
215 Id. § 507(a)(9).
216 Id. § 5o7(a)(io).
217 Seesupra notes 146-188 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
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such as when attorneys bring actions against creditors for violations of
the automatic stay. In these instances, however, the attorneys' services
primarily benefit debtors, with only an indirect and incidental benefit to
the estate. Moreover, debtors' attorneys' fees do not fall within the second
policy justification for priority treatment, because they do not preserve or
enhance the government's social safety net. Although it can be argued that
the attorneys' services in filing bankruptcy petitions allow debtors to avoid
welfare, thus preserving the safety net for others, the bankruptcy process
is, at its core, part of the social safety net provided by the government.
Accordingly, because debtors' attorneys' fees do not fit within either
of the two generally accepted policy justifications for priority treatment
in bankruptcy, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to eliminate
their priority status generally. However, Congress should provide an
exception to this general prohibition if the attorneys' fees offer a clear and
substantial benefit to the bankruptcy estate, such as when the trustee hires
the debtor's attorney to perform legal services on behalf of the estate. The
following is a draft of the statutory language that Congress might use to
implement the changes proposed by this Article.
Section 330 of Title ii U.S.C. should be amended as follows:
i. Delete the phrase "or the debtor's attorney "from section 33o(a)(I)(A) of
Title ii U.S.C.
2. Delete section 33o(a)(4)(B) of Title ii U.S.C. and replace it with the
following:
The fees of a debtor's attorney are governed by this section only to the extent
that the attorney is appointed by the trustee pursuant to section 327 and the
services of such attorney are approved by the Court.
The first amendment removes any ambiguities regarding the application
of Lamie to the priority afforded debtors' attorneys' fees, while the second
amendment eliminates the disparity between Chapter 7 and i i cases, on
the one hand, and Chapter 12 and 13 cases, on the other. It also expands
the reasoning of Lamie to cases filed under Chapter 12 and 13 of the
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Bankruptcy Code.219
D. Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Statutory Amendment
Critics might argue that while the statutory amendment proposed in
this Article unifies the policy underpinnings of the priority rules, it does
so at the expense of debtors because they will be the parties who bear the
financial burden of paying their attorneys' fees if the fees are not afforded
administrative priority treatment. The response to this criticism requires
an understanding of the policies underlying the United States bankruptcy
system. The system is founded on the dual policy justifications of
ensuring the debtor's fresh start 220 while providing for a fair and equitable
distribution of assets to creditors.22' The current treatment of affording
debtors' attorneys' fees administrative priority treatment favors the fresh
start policy over an equitable distribution to creditors. There are many
problems inherent in the Bankruptcy Code. Some provisions unjustly
favor debtors over creditors, and others unduly burden the debtor's fresh
start. The purpose of academic discourse is to approach each issue from a
consistent theoretical perspective in an attempt to harmonize the competing
policy justifications at the base of the Bankruptcy Code. As this Article has
attempted to demonstrate, the treatment of attorneys' fees in bankruptcy
unjustly favors debtors at the expense of a fair and equitable distribution of
the estate's assets to creditors.
219 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lamie, several bankruptcy courts have held
Lamie expressly inapplicable to Chapter 13 cases, and have allowed debtors' attorneys to re-
cover their fees as administrative priority expenses. See, e.g., Holland v. EMC Mortgage Corp.
(In re Holland), 374 B.R. 409 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007); In re Ramirez, No. 03-47872, zoo6 WL
3838176, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, zoo6); In re Gutierrez, 309 B.R. 488, 500-01 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 2004). One commentator has suggested that a 2004 bankruptcy case, Dionne v.
Colvin (In re Moore), 312 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004), conflicts with the Gutierrez line
of cases. C.R. "Chip" Bowles, Jr., The Other Lamie Shoe: Is Employment Regulated by i U.S.C.
§327(a)?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2oo4, at 22. He argues that Moore requires Chapter 13 at-
torneys to be appointed by the trustee under section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code in order to
have their fees treated as administrative priority claims. Id. The commentator, however, mis-
reads Moore. In Moore, the attorneys' fees at issue in the case were not those of the attorney
representing the debtor in his Chapter 13 case; rather, they were the fees of an attorney who
represented the debtor in an unrelated state court action. Thus, the Moore court was entirely
correct in holding that the fees were entitled to administrative priority only under section 327
of the Code and not under section 33o(a)(4)(B). See Moore, 312 B. R. at 909.
220 See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (I977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6o86 (noting that the fresh start allows debtors "to get out from under the debilitating effects
of too much debt" and that "[t]he two most important aspects of the fresh start available under
the Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a return to [al normal [life],
and the discharge, with the release from creditor collection attempts.").
221 See, e.g., Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 4 5 9 , 4 73 (1913); IRS v. Luongo (ln re Luongo),
259 F3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. zooi).
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CONCLUSION
With the troubling economic times facing this country today, it is
imperative that the nation's bankruptcy system operate efficiently to
provide a safety net for those who have lost their homes to foreclosure or
who find themselves in difficult economic situations as a result of the loss of
a job or a health crisis. Yet the Bankruptcy Code has so many unanswered
issues of statutory interpretation that courts' attention is diverted from
assisting honest but unfortunate debtors to attempting to resolve these
thorny issues. It is time that Congress steps in to amend the Bankruptcy
Code and eliminate many of these unresolved statutory interpretation
dilemmas, such as the treatment of debtors' attorneys' fees in bankruptcy.
This Article proposes a statutory amendment to the Bankruptcy Code
that establishes clear guidelines for when debtors' attorneys are entitled to
have their fees treated as administrative priority expenses in a bankruptcy
proceeding. It calls on Congress to adopt the proposal in order to bring the
bankruptcy system one step closer to operating efficiently and effectively
during these difficult economic times.

